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This paper examines the impact of group- and family-ownership on financial 
performance of a sample of firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange from the 
year 2003 to 2008. Since previous studies have found ownership structure to be 
endogenously determined, we account for this problem by using two 2SLS 
technique. This paper contributes to the extant literature as it uses a larger 
sample of 158 firms and the 2SLS technique; existing studies on this topic in 
Pakistan lack both of these aspects. Results of the OLS and 2SLS regressions 
show that group ownership in a firm has no significant impact on a firm’s 
performance. However, when group ownership is significantly higher in a firm, 
the given firm performs poorly. This is an indication of some sort of 
expropriation of the minority shareholders. Moreover, the analysis shows that 
larger firms, firms with higher sales-turnover ratio and growing firms 
performance better than other firms. Firms with higher financial leverage show 
poor financial performance. For comparing the performance of family and non-
family firms, a sample of 28 family and 26 non-family firms listed on Karachi 
Stock Exchange is used. The results of two sample t-tests show that mean 
Tobin’s Q of family firms is economically larger than non-family firms; though 
the difference is statistically insignificant. Accounting-based measures such as 
return on assets, assets turnover, and profit margin show similar statistics – the 
statistical differences are negligible between family and non-family firms.  
 





In today‟s dynamic business environment, several factors drive a firm‟s performance. A 
firms‟ performance depends upon both carefully designed and advised strategic 
decisions taken on the part of the entrepreneur or result of a positive development that 
takes place and mostly both are inevitable. However, there is a list of vital factors that 
are repeatedly observed enabling a firm to outperform their rivals in the most 
competitive industries. For instance, one such critical factor is the ownership structure 
which affects the firm‟s chances to maintain and improve its performance in the future.  
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Researchers have been interested in analyzing the role and impact of ownership 
structures on the outcome of firms in terms of its performance and value. In emerging 
economies like Pakistan and India, family ownerships are popular and getting increased 
attention from the empirical researchers who are evaluating the firm performance in this 
context. The research on ownership structure stems from principal-agent relationship 
first proposed by Adam Smith (1776) and then further investigated by Berle and Means 
(1932), and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Later Fama and Jensen (1983, 1985) studied 
the advantages and the potential problems which the ownership structure may pose to 
the performance of the firm. 
 
Since the family owned businesses exist around the globe (see, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003), the interest in studying the features of family firms and their effect on 
performance of the firm is increasing many folds. The fast growing industry owned by 
family firms can be confirmed by the study of Faccio & Lang (2002) where they 
presented that 44% of 5,232 corporation included as a sample of their study were family 
owned. Family ownership can lead a firm to outperform non-family firms for mainly two 
reasons. First, management of family firms make better investment decisions because 
of the fact that family managers have more firm specific knowledge and are therefore 
more farsighted and have long-term investment ideas. Secondly, family management 
can reduce the notorious principal-agent problem, as it helps in aligning the incentives 
of management with the expectations of the shareholders. Similarly, group association,  
blockholdings and insiders‟ ownership  solve agency problems between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), reduce many transaction costs in labor and 
material markets, provide insurance mechanism to the group firms, and provide a 
mechanism to deal with market failures of different sorts (Tarziján, 1999). However, 
insiders and group ownership is not cost-free. Recently, several studies have shifted the 
focus towards internal conflicts of interests that shareholders can experience in a firm. 
La Porta et al. (2000) found strong evidence that expropriation of minority shareholders 
by controlling insiders is extensive. Different forms of expropriation are possible such as 
outright theft, sale of assets and products to related parties at unfair prices, giving 
lucrative positions to unqualified relatives or paying executives excessively. 
Expropriation creates inefficiency in a financial system in a sense that fund providers 
will be reluctant to surrender their wealth in face of possible expropriation by the 
insiders.  
 
The above discussion highlights that it is an important empirical question whether 
blockholdings and family-group create or destroy value. The main objective of this paper 
is to investigate the impact of associated-firms ownership and family ownership on the 
performance of firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. This paper contributes to 
the extant literature because no other study, to the best of our knowledge, uses as 
larger sample or the methodology as is used in this paper.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing 
literature in light of which we draw testable hypotheses. Data, research design and 





model specification are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents results and 
discussion. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we first discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the link between group 
ownership and firm performance and then discuss whether family ownership can create 
value or not. 
 
2.1 Group Association and Firm Value 
 
When a group of individuals or institutions hold a significant portion of ownership stake 
in a firm, the firm performance can be influenced in several ways. Theoretically, such 
ownership can have implications for firm value from the perspectives of agency costs, 
transaction costs, inefficiency in labor and or product markets, and many other forms of 
market failures. These aspects are reviewed next. 
 
2.1.1 The Monitoring Hypothesis 
 
The presence of group companies can be thought of as a special case of large 
shareholders. The agency problems discussed by Berle and Means (1932) or Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) are alleviated to some extent by large shareholders who have 
incentives and capabilities to monitor the activities of managers (Shleifer and Vishny,  
1986). This agency view suggests a positive link between group association and firm 
performance; 
 
2.1.2 The Minority Shareholders’ Expropriation Hypothesis 
 
Shliefer and Vishny (1997) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that large 
shareholders can exploit minority shareholders due to their power and dominance. The 
expropriation can take many forms like installing unqualified relatives on key 
management positions, excessive compensation plans for executives, tunnelling of 
resources to group companies, or outright theft (La Porta et al. 2000). This leads us to 
test the following hypothesis; 
 
H1: Group ownership beyond a certain threshold level has negative impact on firm’s 
performance.  
 
2.1.3 Group Reputation Hypothesis 
 
It is believed that business groups do not act opportunistically due to their reputation as 
these groups are highly visible. Their visibility might be due to their big sizes and/or 
usually the famous business tycoons or personalities with bureaucratic and political 
backgrounds that sit on their managerial boards (Dewenter et. al, 2001). This view 
again leads to hypothesis 1 (H1). 
 





2.1.4 Group Association as Solution to Market Failures  
 
If a firm is a part of a large group of companies, the firm can reap several benefits from 
the group association. First, group companies can act as large external shareholders 
who can help in controlling expropriations by the top management. James (1999) adds 
to the view by arguing that ownership held by associated firms are more long term in 
nature and this very characteristic of  unmitigated sphere of investment leads to efficient 
strategic decisions. Another argument that goes in favor of associated ownership is that 
a firm can benefit from the goodwill and reputation of the group. Furthermore, group 
companies assist one another through shared resources such as finance, technology, 
and experience (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Wang, 2006; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007; and 
Maury, 2005).  
 
2.1.5 Complexity of Intra-Group Transaction 
 
A complex web of intra-group transactions might make it more difficult for analysts and 
investors to know about their opportunistic behavior. Thus the complexity of intra-group 
transaction can increase the probability of opportunistic behavior. (Dewenter et. al, 
2001). 
 
In an agency framework, a higher ownership percentage of group companies should 
reduce agency conflict between shareholders and managers, but it might lead to severe 
conflicts of interest between majority-insiders and minority-outsiders. Thus, if the group-
reputation hypothesis holds, group companies should exhibit better market and 
accounting performance than non-group companies, as the transaction costs of such 
companies are assumed to be low due to the group size and reputation. However, if 
complexity of transaction hypothesis is true, then group companies would display weak 
performance, which would imply that the group companies are involved in minority 
shareholders exploitation, and/or the group has lower reputation and is facing higher 
transaction costs. 
 
In view of the above, two testable hypotheses are developed. Given that group 
companies monitor the managers‟ activities and/or the firm does not exploit minority 
shareholders due to the group‟s reputation, a testable hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Ownership stake of associated companies in a firm has positive impact on the firm’s 
performance 
 
If group companies do not care about the group‟s image and/or the intra-group 
transactions are considered complex by analysts and shareholders, then they will 
demand risk premium in view of possible expropriation of minority shareholders. A 
testable hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Higher ownership percentage of associated companies in a firm leads to a poor 
performance of the firm. 
   





Some empirical evidence exists on the performance of group companies in Pakistan. 
The study used mainly descriptive statistics in the studying relationship between group 
association and firm performance from 1998 to 2002. Their results showed that group 
firms were larger in size, had lower sales growth variability and a higher operating 
profitability in comparison to non-group firms. 
 
2.2 Family Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Family ownership has several theoretical advantages. First, management of family firms 
make better investment decisions because of the fact that family members have more 
firm specific knowledge and are therefore more farsighted. Second, they have a long-
term investment horizon due to which they take a more mature and long-term approach 
towards the management of the firm. Secondly, family ownership can reduce the 
notorious principal-agent problems which are discussed by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Consistent with the above, several empirical studies such 
as Palia and Ravid (2002), Morck et al. (1988) and Fahlenbrach (2004) have found 
positive impact of family ownership on firm performance.  
 
However, the above advantages of family ownership will be offset by potential costs of 
family ownership. Burkart et al., 2003 argue that management of a firm by family 
members may be potentially less efficient and thus entail loss to the firm when 
compared to other firms which are managed by rather more professional managers. In 
line with these expectations, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) found that reaction of the 
market was negative when family firms hired family members as managers.  
 
Moreover, similar to the arguments presented in the preceding section where we 
discussed the group ownership in relation to firm performance, we can extend that 
discussion to family firms as well. For example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that 
there is a possibility of minority shareholders‟ expropriation in family firms.  
 
Empirical findings related to impact of family ownership on firm performance are mixed. 
Julio et al. (2008) compared the market value of a firm as well as firm performance. 
They found that family owned firms outperformed non-family owned corporations. Their 
study provided interesting results that family ownership positively impacted the firm 
value; however, when the family ownership concentration rises above a certain level, 
the value of a firm decreases. This is an evidence of minority shareholders 
expropriation. Furthermore, it was observed that even though higher ownership 
concentration negatively impacted firm value, still the performance of family firms was 
superior to the non-family firms.  
 
Barontini and Caprio (2005) studied the relationship between firm performance and 
ownership structure with a data of 675 publicly traded companies spread out in 
11different countries throughout the continental Europe. Their results indicated that 
family control had a positive impact on the performance of European corporations. 
However, Barontini and Caprio (2005) observed that the ROA and Tobin Q of a family-
descendant-run corporation were low as compared to founder controlled corporation, 





but as compared to Non-family Corporation, descendant-controlled corporation 
performed better. 
 
Feng-Li and Tsangyao (2010) tried to find the optimal level of family ownership 
concentration studying 242 companies amongst 18 industries of Taiwan. These 
companies were listed between 1997 and 2006. A threshold regression test was 
conducted to determine the optimal level of concentration of family ownership where 
value of a firm would be maximum. Tobin‟s Q was used to determine firm value. They 
calculated three levels of owner's concentration to determine the relationship with firm 
value. The levels were 0.075%, 31.76% and 33.61%. The results showed that at the 
level when ownership concentration is below 0.075%, with a 1% increase in ownership 
the Tobin Q decreases by 257.71%. On the other hand, when the concentration of 
ownership was between 0.075% and 31.76%, the Tobin‟s Q increased by 0.78% with 
every 1% increase in the concentration of ownership. Tobin‟s Q increased by 1.67% 
when the family ownership concentration was between 31.76% and 33.61%. However, 
greater than 33.61%, the Tobin Q rate of increase decreased to 0.51%.  Therefore it 
was concluded that the optimal level of ownership concentration was between 31.76% 
and 33.61% where the value of the firm is at its maximum. (Feng-Li and Tsangyao, 
2010) 
 
A study by Han An and Naughton (2001) on Korean listed firms classified family 
ownership into three categories that were family ownership, pure family ownership and 
owner-control disparity. Data o m3054 firms were used from the year 2000 to 2005. 
They found that family and pure family ownerships increased the firm value and 
performance whereas owner-control disparity had no significant impact on the firm 
performance and value. The calculations were made through Tobin‟s Q for market value 
of firm and ROA to find the performance in accounting terms. They found strong 
evidence that family ownership in Korea mitigated agency problems to a greater extent.  
 
Gürsoy and Aydoğan, (2002) studiedTurkish corporations which are characterized by 
highly concentrated family owned businesses. Their results showed that higher 
ownership concentration in families were associated with higher P/E ratio; however, on 
the same time with lower accounting performance. In comparison to group-owned firms, 
family ownership had lower P/E ratio and thus lower performance and lower risk. 
Whereas government owned firms have higher risk and higher market performance but 
have lower accounting returns.  
 
Benjamin Maury, (2005) conducted a study on a sample of 1672 non-financial firms in 
Western Europe for finding whether non-family controlling shareholders were 
outperformed by family owned and controlled firms. Their results showed that family 
firms had higher performance than other types of owners controlled firms. Tobin‟s Q 
showed that under family control, the value of firm rises by approximately 7% in 
comparison to non-family firms. When ROA was examined, family owned firms had 
almost 16% higher profitability in comparison to non-family.  
 
 





Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigated large publically traded firms of the U.S. to 
determine the relation between the founding family ownership and performance of a 
firm. Their study confirmed that family firms performed at least as well as that of non-
family firms. They used both ROA and Tobin‟s Q as performance measures. The results 
of ROA regressions showed that family firms were significantly more profitable than the 
non-family firms. Further, they found that the returns are even higher when a family‟s 
member acts as CEO. They interpreted that the family member understands the 
business well and work with more dedication. The results from the market-based 
measure of performance showed that family businesses are more valuable. The 
findings were both statistically and economically significant to proves that family firms 
had 11.6% greater Tobin‟s Q than non-family firms. Overall their results were in contrast 
to their hypothesis that minority shareholders were negatively affected by founding 
family ownership rather results proved that family ownership represented an effective 
and efficient organizational structure. 
 
Based on the above discussion and empirical evidence, the following hypothesis can be 
tested 
 
H4: Family ownership has positive impact on firm performance. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1   Sample Selection, Data Collection, and Screening 
 
The initial data sample was based on the firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange 
excluding the financial firms (that are Banks, Modaraba companies, Insurance 
companies etc). The data of these companies were taken for the year 2003 to 2008. 
The financial data and detail of these companies were available from secondary 
sources i.e. from the annual reports published by the companies. For group association, 
we were able to identify 158 firms to have group association of some sorts. For family 
firms, the data was divided on the basis of family and non family ownership. This 
distinction was made by studying the pattern of shareholdings in annual reports of the 
firms as well as by using the websites of the firms. Finally, we were able to find a 















Details of firms included in a sample on the basis of family and non-family 
ownership 
 Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
Initial Sample 71 66 
Non-Operating 6 8 
Missing Financial Data or 
negative values 
37 32 
Final Sample 28 26 
 
Firms such as Banking, Finance, Real Estate and insurance etc were excluded from the 
initial sample. Similarly, those firms which were not operational during the mentioned 
period, or those that were controlled by companies operating in different countries were 
excluded from the research sample. Firms with negative equities, outlier firms and those 
with data unavailable in the time period of the research were also excluded. Thus the 
final sample included 54 firms, divided into two sub groups of 28 family owned and 26 
non family owned firms. 
 
3.2 Measures of Variables 
Different proxies have been used to measure accounting-based and market-based 
performance measures. For measuring accounting based performance, the variables 
Return on Asset (ROA) and Profit margin are used for accounting-based and Tobin‟s Q 
for market-based measures of firm performance. Several other variables of interest are 
also considered. These variables include financial leverage and asset-turnover ratio. 
The choices of these five variables are in consistence with methods of measurement 
applied by previous researchers (Gunduz and Tatoglu, 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Han and Naughton, 2001; Barontini and Caprio, 2005). 
Definitions, explanations and the method of calculation of these variables are as below: 
3.2.1 Associated Ownership (ASSO) 
 
This is measured by the ownership percentage of associated firms and denoted by 
ASSO. This figure excludes any shares held by the board of directors or financial 
institutions that are not associated with the firm. This information is provided in and has 
been retrieved from the companies‟ annual reports. To test the minority expropriation 
hypothesis, we also include a squared term of the ASSO that would indicate whether 
associated companies ownership beyond a certain level leads to different performance 
than at lower levels. 
 







Return on Assets (ROA) is a scaled measure of earnings that is not influenced by the 
financial structure of the company. It is calculated as: 
Return on Assets = net profit / total assets. 
The ratio of return on asset gives us a standard to determine how effectively financial 
managers employ each dollar invested in the asset of the firm, irrespective of whether 
the dollar came from investors or creditors. 
 
3.2.3  Tobin’s Q 
 
Noble laureate, James Tobin from Yale University hypothesized that “The combined 
market value of all the companies on the stock market should be about equal to their 
replacement costs”. The ratio is calculated as: 
 
Tobin‟s Q = Total Market Value of Firm / Total Assets 
Where,  
Total Market Value of Firm = Market value of Equity + Debt 
Market value of Equity = No. of Shares outstanding x Market share price 
Debt = Total asset – Equity 
 
A low Tobin‟s Q (0-1) indicates that a greater cost is implied to replace the firm‟s assets 
than the stock‟s value. Thus it implies that the firm‟s stock is undervalued in the market. 
On the other hand, a higher Tobin‟s Q suggests that the stock of the firm is more 
expensive than the cost of replacement of assets of the firm. Other control explanatory 



















Names, Symbols and Measurements of the Variables Used in This Study 
 
Variable Symbol Measurement 
Associate companies ownership ASSO Shares owned by associate companies / total 
shares 
Tobin‟s Q Q (book value of debt + market value of equity) / 
book value of assets 
Return on Assets ROA Net income / total assets 
Firm Size SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Growth rate GROW Geometric mean of annual percentage increase 
in assets 
Sales Turnover ratio ST Sales/ total assets 
Firm‟s systematic risk BETA Ratio of covariance between stock returns and 
market returns to the variance of market returns 
Firm‟s idiosyncratic risk SER firm-specific error term in the beta regression 
Financial leverage LEV Total debts / total assets 
 
3.3 Analytical Tools 
 
To study the relationship between group ownership in a firm and the firm‟s performance, 
we employ simple OLS and two stage least square method (2SLS) regression methods. 
Studies like Demsetz (1983) propose that ownership structure is an endogenous 
outcome of the profit maximization motive of existing and potential investors. This 
proposition necessitates the use of 2SLS method. For comparison purpose, we report 
results of both the OLS and 2SLS regressions. Our regressions models in this regard 
are as follows. 














Where, BETA, SER, and ST are the instrumental variables for ASSO. INDUS and YEARS are 
dummy variables for 27 industries and 5 years, respectively. Complete list of names and 
measurements of the other variables is given in Table 3.2. 
 
For testing the hypotheses related to family ownership, we use two-sample t-test 
because it is useful in cases where two categories of same categorical variable are to 
be compared. It is a hypothesis test for answering questions about the mean where the 





data are collected from two random samples of independent observations, each from an 
underlying normal distribution. A comparison of this sort is common in social sciences 
and is used as a statistic analysis tool in our research. This test is used because it helps 
in assessing two groups if they are statistically different from each other or not.   
The formula for the pooled estimator of σ2 is given below 
                                                  
Where s1 and s2 are the standard deviations of the two samples and n1 and n2 are the 
sizes of the two samples. The formula for comparing the means of two populations 
using pooled variance is 
                                                        
Where x 1 and x 2 are the means of the two samples, Δ is the hypothesized difference 
between the population means (0 if testing for equal means), sp2 is the pooled 
variance, and n1 and n2 are the sizes of the two samples. The number of degrees of 
freedom for the problem is 
              
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
 
In this section, firs we present descriptive statistics, then results of the regression 
models that test the relationship between associated firms‟ ownership and a firm 
performance. Later, we present and discuss the results of the t-test about family 
ownership and firm performance.  
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 852 0.095 0.109 –0.505 0.570 
ASSO 852 0.297 0.288 0.000 0.970 
ASSO2 852 0.171 0.230 0.000 0.941 
ST 852 1.166 0.892 0.000 6.910 
GROW 852 0.159 0.118 –0.074 0.582 
LEVE 852 0.586 0.204 0.014 1.000 
SIZE 852 7.746 1.556 1.723 12.141 
 
 






Matrix of Correlation among the Variables 
  ROA ASSO ST GROW LEVE SIZE 
ROA 1.000 
    
 ASSO 0.1948 1.000 
   
 ST 0.364 0.245 1.000 
  






–0.114 0.025 0.052 1.000 
 SIZE 0.1605 0.292 0.052 0.117 0.169 1.000 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 show that there are consideration dispersion 
almost in all variables. Matrix of Correlation shows that the problem of multicollinearity is 
not severe among the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the correlations indicate that 
larger firms, firms with higher growth rates, and higher sales turnover, and firms with 
more associated holdings are more profitable than other firms. Financial leverage is 
associated with lower accounting returns. 
 
4.1 Results of the Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4.3 shows results of the regression analysis. Coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are given outside the parentheses in Column 1 and 2, whereas the standard 
errors of the coefficients are given inside the parentheses. The *, **, and *** show 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Both OLS and the 2SLS regressions show similar results. The results indicate that at 
lower levels of ownership percentage of associated firms has no impact on ROA of the 
sampled firms. This finding is in contrast to the positive correlation between ROA and 
ASSO in Table 4.3. The difference lies in the nature of analysis. Univariate analysis may 
not correctly capture the dynamics of relationship between several variables when more 
than one variable affect the dependent variable. The coefficient of ASSO2 is negative 
and statistically significant. This indicates that at higher levels, ownership stake of 
associated firms negatively affects firm performance. This is in line with the minority 
expropriation hypothesis. When group companies become more and more powerful, 
they develop many ways in which they expropriate minority shareholders.  
 
Among the control variables, sales turnover (ST) and firm size (SIZE) have positive 
influence on the firm‟s ROA. Sales turnover is an indicator of a firm‟s efficiency. More 
efficient firms will generate more sales per unit of assets. And firm size can be a proxy 
for economies of scale or the firm‟s riskiness. Larger firms can enjoy many advantages 
which smaller firms cannot enjoy. For example, larger firms have economies of scale 
advantage, have more resources which can be utilized for research and development, 





and have larger market share. Finally, financial leverage has negative impact on firm‟s 
performance. 
 
 Table 4.3  
OLS and 2SLS Regressions for ROA and Associated Firms’ Ownership 
Variables OLS. 2SLS    
ASSO 0.038(0.033) 1.433(0.882)    
ASSO2 –0.081(0.042)*** –1.73(0.925)***    
ST 0.049(0.004)* 0.054(0.008)*    
GROWTH 0.157(0.027)* 0.09(0.062)    
LEVE –0.163(0.015)* –0.137(0.031)*    
SIZE 0.02(0.003)* 0.025(0.01)*    
INDUS1 0.01(0.018) –0.068(0.054)    
INDUS2 0.012(0.01) –0.021(0.026)    
INDUS3 –0.015(0.033) –0.249(0.144)***    
INDUS4 –0.073(0.018)* –0.116(0.04)*    
INDUS5 –0.009(0.011) –0.05(0.03)***    
INDUS6 –0.007(0.012) –0.086(0.049)***    
INDUS7 0.055(0.04) 0.31(0.16)***    
INDUS8 –0.079(0.026)* –0.134(0.056)**    
INDUS9 –0.024(0.016) –0.044(0.031)    
INDUS10 –0.125(0.025)* –0.209(0.065)*    
INDUS11 0.052(0.034) –0.164(0.135)    
INDUS12 0.02(0.015) –0.06(0.052)    
INDUS13 0.034(0.017)** –0.034(0.049)    
INDUS14 0.098(0.017)* 0.053(0.04)    
INDUS15 0.022(0.033) –0.092(0.087)    
INDUS16 –0.036(0.042) 0.165(0.135)    
INDUS17 0.085(0.036)** 0.276(0.125)**    
INDUS18 0.116(0.02)* –0.027(0.087)    
INDUS19 0.106(0.017)* 0.038(0.049)    
INDUS20 0.069(0.013)* –0.04(0.065)    
INDUS21 –0.003(0.019) –0.114(0.07)    
INDUS22 –0.125(0.038)* –0.369(0.152)**    
INDUS23 0.06(0.018)* –0.077(0.083)    
INDUS24 0.023(0.018) –0.005(0.036)    
INDUS25 0.05(0.018)* –0.049(0.064)    
YEAR1 0.009(0.009) 0.008(0.016)    
YEAR2 0.003(0.009) 0.011(0.017)    
YEAR3 0.002(0.009) 0.003(0.017)    
YEAR4 –0.022(0.009)** –0.018(0.017)    
YEAR5 –0.025(0.009)* –0.021(0.017)    
Constant –0.052(0.021)** –0.024(0.041)    
F-Test 7.59 24.31    
R2 0.1359 0.5178    
Adj. R2 0.1241 0.4921    
The table shows regression results of a model where ROA is the dependent variable. ROA is measured 
by net income divided by total assets. Coefficient s of the explanatory variables are given outside the 
parentheses in next columns to their respective variables, whereas the standard errors of the coefficients 





are given inside the parentheses. The *, **, and *** show statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. ASSO is the percentage of shares held of associated companies. ST is sales divided by 
total assets. GROW is the geometric mean of the past five years annual percentage increase in assets. 
LEVE is measured by total debt to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. INDUS are dummy 
variables for 27 industry listed on the KSE. And YEAR are the dummy variable for years.  
4.2 Results of the Two-Sample T-tests 
 
In this section, we discuss the performance comparison of the family and non-family 
firms with help of two sample-tests. The results of the t-tests are given in Table 4.4  
Table 4.4 





Firms Difference T-test 
ROA 1.80% 3.40% -1.60% -1.58 
Tobin's Q 4.48 1.28 3.20 0.95 
ATO 1.04 1.04 0.00 -0.015 
LEVE 0.93 0.7 0.23 4.61* 
PM 0.016 0.012 0.00 0.18 
The table shows results of the t-tests for comparison of various financial aspects off 56 family and non-family firms. ROA is 
measured by net income divided by total assets. Tobin‟s Q is measured by the ratio of market value of equity plus book 
value of debts divided by book value of assets. ATO is sales divided by total assets.. LEVE is measured by total debt to total 
assets. PM signifies profit margin which is calculated by net profit divided by sales..  The *, **, and *** show statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
The results of two sample t-tests for comparing the means of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, Asset 
Turnover, Debt Ratio and Profit margin in family-owned and non-facility owned firms are 
given in Table 4.4. The results show that mean of ROA in family-owned firms is less 
than that of non-family owned firms (1.80% family, 3.40% non-family). However, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at any conventional level.  
The Tobin‟s Q of family-owned firm is economically larger than that of the non-family 
owned firms (4.48 for family and 1.28 for non-family). However, the statistical 
significance of the difference in means is negligible. Once again we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. The T-test was insignificant with the value of 0.95. Both the accounting 
based measures and the market based measures suggest that family ownership does 
not contribute much to the firm‟s value. The accounting based measure, i.e. ROA, 
suggest that family ownership do not result in any increased efficiency in the utilization 
of assets or cost reduction. And market based measure, i.e. Tobin‟s Q, lend further 
support to the ROA results. Since family ownership does not help the firm in improving 
its efficiency, the market is well responsive to this fact as evidenced by the statistically 
insignificance difference of Tobin‟s Q of family and non-family owned businesses.  
 
The accounting-based measures of efficiency are not significantly different in the two 
groups of firms. The mean of Asset Turnover of family firms is approximately same for 





both types of ownership structures. This again shows consistency of the results with the 
previous findings related to ROA and Tobin‟s Q.  
There can be two possible explanations for the indifferences in the financial 
performance between family-owned and non-family-owned business. First, the family 
businesses do not add any value from agency model perspective. Like shown in the 
literature, agency problems can be solved by if managers‟ ownership is increased in the 
firm. Similarly agency problems are mitigated by the presence of some large 
shareholders who is capable of and have ample incentives of monitoring the activities of 
shareholders. Family businesses can be thought to play such roles. But if family 
businesses assume passive roles, these assumed benefits of monitoring will never 
materialize.  
 
The second explanation can be given from minority-expropriation hypothesis 
(reference). Since family-controlled businesses have strong control on many decision of 
the firm, they are in better position to expropriate wealth away from minority 
shareholders. One way of doing so is to collude with the accountants and internal 
auditors to inflate cost of production or deflate sales revenue in accounts. This way, 
even if the firm is profitable, it will show mundane performance. The increased-
monitoring advantage because of family-control will be downplayed by the fraudulent 
accounts. Resultantly, the family-control advantage will never be shown in the 
accounting or market based measures of performance.  
 
Debt ratio result showed that mean of 0.93 of family firm is higher than 0.7 of non-family 
firms, this result is significant with a T-test value of 4.61. One explanation of such a 
higher leverage ratio in family-controlled firms can be that these firms rely primarily on 
debt-financing for control purposes. Such firms do not want to dilute the family control 




This research determines the impact of group-association and family ownership on 
financial performance of a sample of firms listed on the KSE. This research is motivated 
by the ubiquitous presence of group-firms and family-owned firms in Pakistan. There 
are several trade-offs that group-association and family ownership offer. The question 
that concerns shareholders is that whether family and group firms creates value of 
destroys values for other minority shareholders. This paper tries to provide some 
preliminary evidence related to this question. Towards this end, two important aspects 
ownership structures are analyzed; the ownership stake of associated firms and the 
ownership of family firms. To know the impact of the former on the firms‟ performance, 
OLS and 2SLS techniques are used on a sample of 158 firms. And in the case of the 
later, a two sample t-test is used to differentiate between the performance of family and 
non-family firms. Results of the OLS and 2SLS regressions show that group ownership 
in a firm has no significant impact on a firm‟s performance. However, when group 
ownership is significantly higher in a firm, the given firm performs poorly. This is an 
indication of some sort of expropriation of the minority shareholders. Moreover, the 





analysis shows that larger firms, firms with higher sales-turnover ratio and growing firms 
performance better than other firms. Firms with higher financial leverage show poor 
financial performance. 
 
For comparing the performance of family and non-family firms, a sample of 28 family 
and 26 non-family firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange was taken for the years 2003 
to 2008. Two sample T-test was applied as a statistical tool for finding mean differences 
of different performance variables between family and non-family firms. The results 
indicate that Tobin‟s Q of family firm is economically larger than non-family firms, 
suggesting that the market perceives the family firms better than non-family firms; 
though the difference is statistically insignificant. Accounting-based measure such as 
return on assets, assets turnover, and profit margin show similar statistics – the 
statistical differences are negligible between family and non-family businesses. There 
can be two possible explanations for the indifferences in the financial performance 
between family-owned and non-family-owned business. First, the family businesses do 
not add any value from agency model perspective. This happens when family 
businesses assume passive roles; the assumed benefits of monitoring do not 
materialize. The second explanation can be given from minority-expropriation 
hypothesis. Since family-controlled businesses have strong control on many decision of 
the firm, they are in better position to expropriate wealth away from minority 
shareholders. Thus, it is possible that family ownership has advantages, but at the 
same time they indulge in minority-expropriation. The expropriation offsets the 
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